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Enhancing Environmental Protection in 
Relation to Armed Conflict: An Assessment 
of the ILC Draft Principles 
BY DANIËLLA DAM-DE JONG AND BRITTA SJÖSTEDT* 
Abstract: This article examines the outcome of the International 
Law Commission’s (ILC) Study on the Protection of the Environment in 
relation to Armed Conflict as adopted on first reading. The twenty-eight 
draft principles, adopted by the ILC in July 2019, aim to enhance envi-
ronmental protection before, during, and after armed conflict. This article 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the draft principles and high-
lights principal innovations of the draft principles. Then this article con-
cludes that the ILC study makes important substantive contributions to 
enhancing environmental protection, but it also misses opportunities to 
advance the law in this field. The principal strength of the study is that it 
brings in many different aspects relating to the environment and armed 
conflicts under one framework, including legal questions that were hith-
erto neglected. Its weaknesses relate most notably to the protection of the 
environment during armed conflict. This article argues that, even though 
there was limited space for the ILC to develop the applicable law in this 
field, it nevertheless could have been more ambitious. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 8, 2019, the International Law Commission (ILC) provi-
sionally adopted, on first reading, a set of twenty-eight draft principles on 
the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict.1 This mile-
stone marks the conclusion of the impressive study conducted by ILC 
 
* Daniëlla Dam-de Jong is Associate Professor at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies 
at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Britta Sjöstedt is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Law 
at Lund University, Sweden. The authors wish to thank the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review for their diligent support. Any remaining mistakes are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. 
 1. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/10 ¶ 
17, at 5 (2019) [hereinafter A/74/10]. 
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Special Rapporteurs Marie Jacobsson (Sweden) and Marja Lehto (Fin-
land) on this topic over the past several years.2 It is now up to States in 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s Sixth Committee, interna-
tional organizations, and others to provide their views on the principles, 
which will inform the second reading of the principles planned for 2022. 
The adoption of the draft principles is timely. Globally, environ-
mental security is high on the international agenda. Recent incidents in 
northern Iraq have demonstrated the ability for warfare to cause extensive 
and sometimes irreversible environmental damage.3 Given the threats to 
ecological integrity resulting from climate change and loss of biodiver-
sity, risks associated with the environment for the (renewed) outbreak of 
armed conflicts are only growing.4 In the past five years, the UN Security 
Council has held a record number of meetings on environmental security, 
including on the protection of the environment during armed conflict, wa-
ter security, climate-related security risks and natural resources as root 
causes of armed conflict.5 Furthermore, the Assembly of UN Environ-
ment (or UN Environment Programme (UNEP)) adopted two resolutions 
addressing environmental protections in conflict situations in 2016 and 
 
 2. See Marie G. Jacobsson (Special Rapporteur), Preliminary Report on the Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/674 (May 30, 
2014) [hereinafter A/CN.4/674]; see also Marie G. Jacobsson (Special Rapporteur), Second Report 
on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/685 (May 28, 2015) [hereinafter A/CN.4/685]; see also Marie G. Jacobsson (Special Rap-
porteur), Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, Int’l 
Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/700 (June 3, 2016) [hereinafter A/CN.4/700]; see also Marja 
Lehto (Special Rapporteur), First Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/720 (Apr. 30, 2018) [hereinafter A/CN.4/720]; 
see also Marja Lehto (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflicts, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/728 (Mar. 27, 2019) [herein-
after A/CN.4/728]. 
 3. See Wim Zwijnenburg & Foeke Postma, Living Under a Black Sky – Conflict Pollution 
and Health Concerns in Iraq, PAX, Dec. 5, 2017, https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-
publications/living-under-a-black-sky; see also U.N. Env’t Programme [UNEP], Environmental Is-
sues in Areas Retaken from ISIL Mosul, Iraq: Rapid Scoping Mission July-Aug. 2017 – Technical 
Note, (2017), https://www.wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22434/environmental
_issues_Isil_Iraq.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 4. U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8372nd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8372 (Oct. 16, 2018) (statement 
by U.N. Secretary-General, António Guterres); see also Inst. for Econ. & Peace, Global Peace 
Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, VISION OF HUMANITY (2019), https://www.vi-
sionofhumanity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/GPI-2019-Briefingweb-2.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7818th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7818 (Nov. 22, 2016); see 
also, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8307th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.8307 (July 11, 2018); see also, 
e.g., S/PV.8372, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
- Security Council Arria-formula meeting, UN WEB TV (Nov. 6, 2018), http://www.webtv.un.org
/watch/protection-of-the-environment-during-armed-conflict-security-council-arria-formula-
meeting/5859032430001/; see also, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 76d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2020/929 (Sept. 23, 
2020). 
FINAL_FOR_JCI 8/4/21  6:54 PM 
2021] Enhancing Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict 131 
2017, respectively, the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) adopted 
a strategy on environmental protection and management for UN peace-
keeping operations in November 2017 and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently revised its guidelines on the pro-
tection of the environment during armed conflict.6  
The ILC draft principles have the potential to bring coherence to and 
further develop and clarify the applicable law in this area, based on the 
ILC’s dual mandate to promote “the progressive development of interna-
tional law and its codification.”7 With the completion of the ILC study 
and the provisional adoption of the draft principles, the time has come to 
take stock of their contribution to their stated purpose of “enhancing the 
protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict, including 
through preventive measures for minimizing damage to the environment 
during armed conflict and through remedial measures.”8 The objective of 
this article is to critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of the draft 
principles and to highlight their principal innovations. 
II.  CONTEXT, PURPOSE, AND APPROACH 
The topic of Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
was included in the ILC’s programme of work at the instigation of a 2009 
report prepared by the Assembly of UN Environment and the Environ-
mental Law Institute (ELI) on environmental protection during armed 
conflict.9 This report, which built upon an important body of international 
legal scholarship,10 concluded that the international legal framework for 
the protection of the environment during armed conflict presents several 
gaps and deficiencies, largely because the relevant rules were developed 
 
 6. See, e.g., U.N. Env’t Assembly Res. 2/15 (Aug. 4, 2016); see also, e.g., U.N. Env’t As-
sembly Res. 3/1 (Jan. 30, 2018); see also, e.g., U.N. Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, 
Executive Summary, (Nov. 2017) https://www.peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/171116_dfs
_exec_summary_environment_0.pdf; see also ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural 
Environment in Armed Conflict (2020), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/guidelines-protection-
natural-environment-armed-conflict-rules-and-recommendations-relating. 
 7. G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1 (Nov. 21, 1947) (amended Nov. 18, 1981). On the ILC’s mandate 
and contribution to international law, see Charles Jalloh, Introduction, 13 FIU L. Rev. 975(2019). 
 8. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 216. 
 9. U.N. Env’t Programme [UNEP], Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An 




 10. See e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Protection of the Environment in International Armed Conflict, 
5 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 523 (2001); KAREN HULME, WAR TORN ENVIRONMENT: INTERPRETING 
THE LEGAL THRESHOLD (2004). 
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between the 1900s and 1970s.11 This was an era in which international 
environmental law (and the science underlying it) was still in its early 
stages of development and the law of armed conflict predominantly reg-
ulated warfare between (instead of within) States. The report appealed 
directly to the ILC to “examine the existing international law for protect-
ing the environment during armed conflict and recommend how it can be 
clarified, codified and expanded.”12 The ILC was considered to be in a 
unique position to undertake such a study. First, because its general ex-
pertise enables it to undertake a comprehensive study into the applicable 
international law, going beyond the law of armed conflict proper. Second, 
because the ILC’s practice of legal codification and development is di-
rectly connected to the political process, in the sense that the ILC’s work 
and outcomes are submitted to and discussed within the UN General As-
sembly. 
The report’s appeal to the ILC was welcomed by ILC member Ja-
cobsson, who suggested the topic be included in the ILC’s long-term pro-
gramme of work. One of the study’s principal aims would be to “[c]larify 
the applicability of and the relationship between International Humani-
tarian Law, International Criminal Law, International Environmental 
Law and Human Rights Law.”13 In this way, the study would seek to fur-
ther develop the findings of the ILC’s work on the Effect of Armed Con-
flict on Treaties, which had formulated a general presumption that envi-
ronmental and human rights treaties continue to apply during armed 
conflict.14 A second principal aim of the new study would be to develop 
proposals “to achieve a uniform and coherent system” for the protection 
of the environment in relation to armed conflict,15 thereby building on the 
ILC’s monumental study on addressing fragmentation in international 
law.16 
In light of these aims, a temporal approach, examining the three 
phases of before, during, and after armed conflict, was preferred over a 
thematic approach to the topic.17 This methodological choice is also re-
flected in the title of the topic, which refers to environmental protection 
 
 11. Protection of the Environment During in International Armed Conflict, supra note 10, at 
51-52. 
 12. Id. at 53. 
 13. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, 
annex E, at 358 (2011) [hereinafter A/66/10]. 
 14. Id. at 357. 
 15. Id. at 358. 
 16. Martti Koskenniemi (Chairman of the Study Grp.), Fragmentation of the Int’l Law Diffi-
culties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Int’l Law, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 & Corr. 1 (2006). 
 17. A/CN.4/674, supra note 2, ¶ 58. 
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“in relation” to armed conflict instead of “during” armed conflict, thereby 
departing from the original proposal of the UNEP 2009 report. This ap-
proach was overall well received by the other ILC members,18 and States 
in the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee.19 Yet, two main issues 
were raised. The first issue concerned the study’s proposed focus on the 
“before” and “after” phases of armed conflict (i.e., obligations of rele-
vance to a potential armed conflict as well as post-conflict measures). 
Some members of the ILC and multiple States felt that the focus should 
instead be shifted to the “during” phase.20 However, such a shift would 
present the risk that the ILC would be forced “to walk on a trodden path, 
thus questioning the added valued [sic.] that the topic could bring.”21 The 
second major concern related to the feasibility of the temporal approach. 
ILC members cautioned that, due to the overlap of the various phases of 
an armed conflict, a strict division of the draft principles into distinct 
phases would risk being artificial.22 This criticism has proven justified as 
far as the pre-conflict phase is concerned. On first reading, a separate 
section discussing principles that apply exclusively to this phase is miss-
ing. Nonetheless, notwithstanding these limitations, it can be argued that 
a major strength of the temporal approach is that it facilitates an integra-
tive and unified approach to the topic, which may not have been achieved 
if a thematic approach had been employed. 
A final choice the ILC had to make regarded what form the study 
would be presented in. In light of the Commission’s broad mandate, sev-
eral options could have been envisaged for the ultimate form and presen-
tation of the study, including draft articles as a first step towards a new 
treaty. The Commission, however, opted for draft principles. Several con-
siderations inspired this choice, including the observation that there were 
stark differences in normative value between the applicable rules. The 
Commission considered principles to be more appropriate to capture 
these differences, providing some principles that reflect customary inter-
national law and others that set out best practices, often formulated as 
recommendations.23 The decision to opt for draft principles arguably re-
duces the potential impact of the study on State practice, as States may 
more easily dismiss the principles as being non-binding. It is, however, 
 
 18. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/68/10 ¶ 137 
(2013) [hereinafter A/68/10]. 
 19. A/CN.4/674, supra note 2, ¶ 14. 
 20. A/68/10, supra note 18, ¶ 137. 
 21. Int’l Law Comm’n, 70th Sess., 3426th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3426 (Aug. 8, 
2018) (statement by Ambassador Marja Lehto). 
 22. A/68/10, supra note 18, ¶ 137. 
 23. Id. ¶ 79; A/CN.4/674, supra note 2, ¶ 89. 
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also a sign of the times, reflecting a development of the ILC in favor of 
the codification and progressive development of customary norms over 
treaty-making.24 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE DRAFT PRINCIPLES 
The draft principles have been divided into five parts. Part One sets 
out the scope of the principles and their purpose.25 Part Two contains gen-
eral principles that pertain to the entire conflict cycle, including principles 
that are particularly relevant for the prevention phase (phase I).26 Part 
Three contains principles that apply during conflict (phase II),27 with spe-
cialized principles for situations of occupation in Part Four.28 Finally, Part 
Five formulates principles for the post-conflict phase (phase III).29 
A.  Part One: Introduction 
Principle 1 sets out the scope of application of the draft principles, 
namely “the protection of the environment before, during or after an 
armed conflict,” without including definitions of environment nor of 
armed conflict.30 A principle explaining key terms was suggested but later 
removed due to disagreements among ILC members on whether such an 
explanation was necessary.31 Also, the ILC has yet to decide whether it 
will use the term “natural environment” or “environment” in the Part 
Three provisions applicable to the “during” phase. This appeared to be an 
important choice for the ILC. Employing the term “natural environment” 
would be consistent with the law of armed conflict as lex specialis during 
armed conflict, but it could give the impression that other fields of inter-
national law are not relevant to the “during” phase.32 Employing the term 
“environment” instead would be more in line with terminology in other 
fields of international law, including international environmental law, but 
it could be interpreted as extending protections under the law of armed 
conflict to the man-made environment, thereby restricting the conduct of 
 
 24. Laurence R. Helfer & Timothy Meyer, The Evolution of Codification: A Principal-Agent 
Theory of the International Law Commission’s Influence, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INT’L LAW IN A 
CHANGING WORLD 305 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016). 
 25. A/CN.4/685, supra note 2, at 72. 
 26. A/CN.4/685, supra note 2, ¶ 18, at annex I. 
 27. A/CN.4/685, supra note 2, ¶ 19, at annex I; A/CN.4/728, supra note 2, at annex I. 
 28. A/CN.4/720, supra note 2, ¶ 99. 
 29. A/CN.4/674, supra note 2, ¶ 59; A/CN.4/700, supra note 2, at annex I. 
 30. A/CN.4/674, supra note 2, ¶ 59. 
 31. A/CN.4/685, supra note 2, ¶ 10. 
 32. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 215. 
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warfare beyond what may be reasonably expected of belligerents. Argu-
ably, this discussion on terminology is mostly of an academic character, 
as the use of the term “environment” in international environmental law 
has never resulted in confusion regarding the object of protection, not-
withstanding the absence of a definition. 
B.  Principles of General Application 
Principle 3(1) affirms the general obligation under international law 
for States to take measures within their domestic systems to protect the 
environment in relation to armed conflicts.33 This broadly formulated 
Principle refers to “legislative, administrative, and judicial and other 
measures to enhance the protection of the environment.”34 Some exam-
ples of such obligations are included in the commentary.35 For instance, 
States are required to: (1) disseminate the content of the law on armed 
conflict to armed forces as well to the civilian population;36 (2) perform a 
weapons review to ensure that the employment of new weapons does not 
violate any rules under international law, including human rights law and 
international environmental law;37 and (3) record the laying of mines.38 
The second paragraph of Principle 3 invites States to take voluntary 
measures to enhance environmental protection in relation to armed con-
flict. This paragraph highlights the wide-ranging existing practices States 
and international organizations undertake that are complementary to their 
legal obligations to protect the environment in armed conflicts.39 
Principle 4 addresses the possibility of designating areas of major 
ecological and cultural importance as protected zones in case of armed 
conflict. It encourages States to enter agreements regarding such zones or 
otherwise designate such areas (in peacetime or during armed conflict).40 
Meanwhile, the corresponding Principle 17, situated in Part Three (prin-
ciples applicable during armed conflict), obliges States to protect these 
 
 33. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 217. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 37. Id. at art. 36. 
 38. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices, art. 9, as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II, as amended on 3 May 1996) annexed to 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which 
may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 
[hereinafter Protocol II to the CCW]. 
 39. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 220-21. 
 40. Id. at 221. 
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zones against attacks, unless they contain a military objective.41 While the 
designation of protected zones can be done at any point in time in accord-
ance with Principle 4, Principle 17 only applies when there is an ex-
pressed agreement on the designation.42 The term “agreement” should be 
“understood in its broadest sense as including mutual as well as unilateral 
declarations accepted by the other party, treaties and other types of agree-
ments, as well as agreements with non-State actors.”43 Hence, despite the 
explicit reference to States in the draft principles, they also encompass 
agreements concluded by non-State actors.44 
Principles 4 and 17 build on protection regimes under the law of 
armed conflict, such as the protection of cultural property,45 hospital and 
safety zones,46 neutralized zones,47 and demilitarized zones,48 on the one 
hand and existing practices under multilateral environmental agreements 
on the other. Within international environmental law, the designation of 
protected areas is a commonly used tool to safeguard inter alia important 
ecosystems, endangered species, or cultural landscapes. The commentary 
refers to the World Heritage Convention protecting cultural and natural 
sites, the Convention on Biological Diversity providing for in situ con-
servation of biodiversity, and the Ramsar Convention protecting wetlands 
of international importance as relevant examples.49 
Unfortunately, neither the draft principles nor the commentaries 
clarify whether the relevant environmental treaties remain applicable dur-
ing armed conflicts. This raises the question as to whether the designation 
of sites pursuant to these treaties creates obligations for States to protect 
them in times of armed conflict or whether Principle 17 only applies to 
areas that have been designated as protected zones under an expressed 
agreement by the Parties to the armed conflict. In other words, even if the 
State(s) in question is/are obligated to protect particular areas pursuant to 
 
 41. Id. at 260. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, opened for signature May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 
215, 240. 
 46. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 14, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV]; JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, [1: RULES] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 119-20 (reprt. 2009) (2005). 
 47. Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 46, at art. 15; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 46, at 119-20. 
 48. Protocol I, supra note 36, at art. 60; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 46, at 
120-21. 
 49. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 221, 223. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI 8/4/21  6:54 PM 
2021] Enhancing Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict 137 
an international treaty, such as the World Heritage Convention, the Prin-
ciple is silent on the question of whether such obligations extend to situ-
ations of armed conflict. The ILC missed an opportunity here to clarify 
and build further synergies between the law of armed conflict and inter-
national environmental law. This is especially unfortunate as the pre-
sumption formulated in the Commission’s previous study on the Effects 
of Armed Conflict on Treaties regarding the continued application of en-
vironmental treaties was in need of further clarification.50 
Based on the logic of the law of armed conflict, a protected zone 
that contains a military objective will lose its protection against attacks. 
According to the commentary, “the reference to the word ‘contain’ […] 
is intended to denote that it may be the entire zone or only parts thereof” 
that lose the protection.51 Furthermore, the commentary states that “the 
conditional protection is an attempt to strike a balance between military, 
humanitarian and environmental concerns.”52 However, it does not ex-
plain how a military objective located in the zone affects the protection. 
From context, the protection of these zones appears to follow the ap-
proach in Article 60 in Protocol I regulating demilitarized zones, which 
revokes the protection if the protected area is used for military purposes.53 
In such cases, only the general protection under the law of armed conflict 
will apply. Principles 4 and 17, therefore, reflect the special protective 
regimes under the law of armed conflict based on area-defined protection 
of other special objects. Due to this fallback to the law of armed conflict 
and because of their failure to resolve the existing uncertainty related to 
the obligations of States under relevant environmental agreements, the 
normative contribution of these Principles is questionable. 
 
 50. Criticism with respect to the lack of guidance provided by the ILC on the applicability of 
international environmental treaty obligations in situations of armed conflict is reflected in the 
statements of various State delegations in the Sixth Committee and by UN Environment. See e.g., 
Italy, U.N. GAOR, 74th Sess., 28th meeting, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.28 (Nov. 29, 2019); 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Comments On International Las Commission 
(ILC) Draft Principles On Protrection Of The Environment In Relation To Armed Conflicts (Nov. 
23, 2020), https://www.legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/73/pdfs/english/poe_unep.pdf. See Britta Sjöstedt, 
The Role Of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Reconciliatory Approach To Environmen-
tal Protection In Armed Conflict (2020) (containing a thorough study of the role of MEAs in provid-
ing protection to the environment in situations of armed conflict). 
 51. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 260. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. The original proposal used the wording “demilitarized zones;” however, during the 
drafting process this wording was replaced with ‘protected zones’ to differ from “demilitarized 
zones.” Id. at 221. According to the commentary however, demilitarized zones have a special mean-
ing within law of armed conflict as they “are established by the parties to a conflict and imply that 
the parties are prohibited from extending their military operations to that zone if such extension is 
contrary to the terms of their agreement.” Id. 
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Principle 5, providing specifically for the protection of indigenous 
peoples’ environment in relation to armed conflict, is closely connected 
to Principles 4 and 17. The ancestral lands of indigenous peoples are often 
both of major ecological and cultural importance. In the commentary to 
Principle 4, it is noted how certain “protected area[s] may also serve to 
conserve the particular culture, knowledge and way of life of the indige-
nous populations living inside the area concerned.”54 References are 
made to indigenous peoples’ special relationship with their environment, 
which has a fundamental importance to their survival.55 It is generally 
recognized that States have obligations under international law to protect 
the lands of indigenous peoples.56 This Principle not only reaffirms these 
obligations, but it recognizes the effects of armed conflict on indigenous 
peoples’ lands. The relevance of Principle 5 for this topic was contested 
by several members of the ILC and States.57 It is for this reason that the 
inclusion of the Principle, notwithstanding its recommendatory nature, is 
a major accomplishment. 
Principle 6 addresses agreements concluded between States and in-
ternational organizations concerning the presence of military forces in re-
lation to armed conflict. It is formulated as a recommendation directed to 
States to include environmental provisions in such agreements. As stated 
in the commentary, the purpose of the Principle “is to reflect recent de-
velopments whereby States and international organizations have begun 
addressing matters relating to environmental protection in agreements 
concerning the presence of military forces concluded with host States.”58 
Principle 7 refers to binding obligations of States and international 
organizations when involved in peace operations in order to limit their 
environmental impact. Principle 7 has a broad scope covering any type 
of peace operation and not necessarily only military forces, as is the case 
with Principle 6. The commentary to this Principle expressly refers to 
practice of the UN, European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) and the environmental policies, guidelines, and rec-
ommendations adopted by these organizations.59 Thus, given that the 
practice supporting this Principle is of the non-binding nature, the formu-
 
 54. Id. at 223. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at 
art. 26 (Oct. 2, 2007); Convention (No. 169) Concerning the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, art. 4, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Convention 169]. 
 57. A/CN.4/720, supra note 2, ¶ 9. 
 58. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 227. 
 59. Id. at 231. 
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lation of an obligation is significant and a clear example of the progres-
sive development of the law. As the discussion on this Principle and its 
relevance for the topic in the Sixth Committee was inconclusive, this 
Principle will most likely receive attention upon second reading.60 
Principle 8 deals with the environmental effects of human displace-
ment, which are often of a significant scale. The Principle is formulated 
as a recommendation for States as well as for international organizations 
to take measures to prevent and mitigate the environmental adverse ef-
fects of displacement while providing relief and assistance. The commen-
tary refers to efforts already being made by aid organizations such as the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to minimize the envi-
ronmental impacts of displacement camps.61 The reference to providing 
relief connects to the previous work of the ILC on the Protection of Per-
sons in the Event of Disasters, although the adopted draft articles on this 
topic lack the express consideration of the environment.62 
The closing draft principles of this part address various issues of 
international responsibility for environmental harm. Principle 9 sets out 
the basic rule that States are responsible for internationally wrongful acts 
that cause damage to the environment, in accordance with the ILC articles 
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It is 
pertinent to note that in this context responsibility can be shared by a plu-
rality of States, for example when military coalitions have engaged in 
unlawful acts resulting in environmental damage. Importantly, the Prin-
ciple does not cover environmental damage resulting from lawful military 
activities, as these would not constitute breaches of international obliga-
tions.63 Principle 9 further determines that States are under an obligation 
to make full reparation for environmental damage resulting from interna-
tionally wrongful acts and - most significantly - that this includes repara-
tion for “damage to the environment in and of itself.”64 The Principle 
 
 60. A/CN.4/720, supra note 2, ¶ 11 (referenced as Principle 8 in Lehto’s draft principles). 
 61. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r. for Refugees [UNHCR], UNHCR Environmental Guide-
lines (June 1996), https://www.refworld.org/docid/42a01c9d4.html [hereinafter UNHCR Guide-
lines]. It must be noted that the Principle seems to focus on environmental degradation around 
displacement camps, while damage to the environment is also often caused while people are on the 
move. Some delegations at the Sixth Committee have therefore proposed to expand the geograph-
ical scope of the Principle to include areas that displaced persons transit while looking for safety. 
See Ukraine, U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 26th meeting ¶ 125, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.26 (Nov. 18, 
2019); Lebanon, U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 30th meeting ¶ 105, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.30 (Dec. 9, 
2019). 
 62. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10 
¶ 48 (Sept. 19, 2016). 
 63. A/CN.4/728, supra note 2, ¶ 116. These questions are addressed in Principle 26 on relief 
and assistance, included in the section that addresses post-conflict. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 289. 
 64. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 235. 
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thereby clearly follows the groundbreaking work of the UN Compensa-
tion Commission on environmental liability and the 2018 judgment by 
the International Court of Justice concerning Certain Activities Carried 
Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, which adopted an ecosystem ap-
proach with respect to compensation for environmental harm.65 
Principles 10 and 11 address the responsibilities of States to regulate 
their corporations and to hold them liable for their wrongdoings. Principle 
10 addresses States’ responsibility to adopt appropriate legislation and to 
take other measures aimed at ensuring due diligence for corporations and 
other business entities operating in or from their territories with respect 
to the protection of the environment in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions. The Principle further stipulates that “such measures include those 
aimed at ensuring that natural resources are purchased or obtained in an 
environmentally sustainable manner.”66 Even though phrased as a recom-
mendation, the inclusion of this Principle is momentous, as it introduces 
a distinct responsibility for home States to regulate their corporations 
abroad for the purpose of protecting the environment and, more specifi-
cally, for ensuring sustainable supply chains. It thereby aligns with novel 
developments at the international and domestic levels establishing (both 
hard and soft) due diligence obligations for corporations.67 
Principle 11 addresses corporate liability. It formulates a threefold 
recommendation for States. First, States “should take appropriate legisla-
tive and other measures aimed at ensuring that corporations […] operat-
ing in or from their territories can be held liable for harm caused by them 
to the environment” in conflict and post-conflict situations.68 Second, and 
groundbreaking, the Principle encourages States to pierce the corporate 
veil by introducing liability for subsidiaries acting under a corporation’s 
 
 65. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 
Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. Rep. 15, ¶¶ 41-43 (Feb. 2). See GULF WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN 
COMPENSATION COMMISSION: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY (Cymie Payne & Peter Sand eds., 
2011) (discussing the UN Compensation Commission’s work). 
 66. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 238. 
 67. See e.g., U.N. Off. Of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. [OHCHR], Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrin-
ciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; see also, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/
1922428.pdf; see also, e.g., The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, 2017 O.J. (L 130/1) (laying down supply chain 
due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold 
originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas). 
 68. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 243. 
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de facto control.69 Lastly, the Principle determines that “States should 
provide adequate and effective procedures and remedies, in particular for 
the victims of such harm.”70 
Compared to the original proposal submitted by the Special Rappor-
teur, the Principle has been rephrased in some respects to meet the con-
cerns of ILC members regarding the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion by home States and its implications for the policy space of host 
States. These changes were meant to emphasize on the one hand the non-
hortatory character of the Principle and on the other to avoid providing 
home States a foundation for an aggressive exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction. It is only in situations in which host States are not in the posi-
tion to effectively enforce their legislation that “the home State of a mul-
tinational enterprise has a particularly important role in providing 
effective remedy for alleged wrongdoings.”71 
The inclusion of principles addressing corporate responsibility and 
liability for environmental damage caused in conflict zones is highly rel-
evant, not in the least because of these actors’ (direct or indirect) involve-
ment in environmentally destructive practices such as the illicit exploita-
tion of natural resources. However, as armed groups are also heavily 
involved in these very same practices, it is all the more remarkable that a 
principle addressing their responsibility is missing. The absence of such 
a principle was criticized by some ILC members and States. It was, for 
example, argued that the effect was “to cast corporations as the lone vil-
lains” with respect to illegal exploitation of natural resources during 
armed conflict, while overlooking “wrongdoers such as insurgencies, mi-
litias, criminal organizations and individual criminals.”72 
 
 69. It should however be noted that the ILC takes a narrower approach than the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights on the issue of liability. The UN Guiding Principles also 
foresee liability for corporations in relation to their business partners. See Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, supra note 67, at 11. For instance, the commentary to Principle 7 of 
the UN Guiding Principles, addressing the responsibility of home States for corporations operating 
in conflict zones, encourages States to explore liability for corporations that “[…] commit or con-
tribute to gross human rights abuses” in conflict-affected areas. Id. at 10. See also more generally 
Principle 3, which encourages States, as part of their duty to protect, to “[e]nforce laws that are 
aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business enterprises to respect human rights […]”. Id. at 
4. This responsibility to respect is defined in Principle 13 as “[a]void causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, […]” as well as to “[s]eek to prevent or 
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or ser-
vices by their business relationships […]”. Id. at 14. 
 70. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 243. 
 71. A/CN.4/728, supra note 2, ¶ 92. 
 72. Int’l Law Comm’n, 71st Sess., 3465th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3465 (June 24, 
2019) (statement of Mr. Sean Murphy). See also Ukraine, U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 26th meeting ¶ 
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Although one can be sympathetic to this criticism, it does not do 
justice to the differences between corporations and armed groups. Where 
States have the ability to regulate their corporations, armed groups by 
definition challenge the domestic order and are generally not subject to 
State regulation. Options to hold armed groups responsible for violations 
of international law within domestic jurisdictions are therefore limited. 
Conversely, there is currently no mechanism in international law to hold 
armed groups directly responsible, as pointed out by Special Rapporteur 
Lehto in her second report.73 Instead, individual members of armed 
groups can be held accountable under international criminal law. For ex-
ample, the prohibition of pillage, as included in the Part addressing the 
during phase, would be an appropriate mechanism, at least where illegal 
exploitation is concerned. Furthermore, as discussed in the following 
Part, the ILC takes the position that the prohibition to cause widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the environment - included in the 1977 
Additional Protocol I and in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court - also applies to non-international armed 
conflicts as a matter of customary international law. While this develop-
ment is not yet mirrored in Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute that lists 
war crimes applicable to non-international armed conflicts, the ILC’s po-
sition on this can prove a powerful incentive for States wishing to see an 
enhanced responsibility regime for armed groups to push for an amend-
ment of the Rome Statute. 
C.  Principles Applicable during Armed Conflict 
The during phase (phase II) was at the heart of the UN Environment 
and ELI’s original appeal to the ILC to provide recommendations on the 
ways in which the international legal framework could be “clarified, cod-
ified and expanded.”74 The study’s approach to this phase fostered con-
siderable debate in the Sixth Committee. The controversy focused on two 
aspects: the role of the law of armed conflict as lex specialis in relation 
to the applicability of other fields of international law and the question of 
whether the effects of particular weapons on the environment should be 
included in the study.75 Special Rapporteur Jacobsson consistently em-
phasized that the starting point for the Commission’s work on the topic 
 
126, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.26 (Nov. 18, 2019); United States, U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 30th meet-
ing ¶ 117, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.30 (Dec. 9, 2019). 
 73. A/CN.4/728, supra note 2, at 28. 
 74. Protection of the Environment During in International Armed Conflict, supra note 10, at 
53. 
 75. A/CN.4/685, supra note 2, ¶ 19. 
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was to identify and clarify the guiding principles and obligations that ap-
ply to the protection of the environment in situations of armed conflict 
and not to modify the law of armed conflict.76 
This decision, which was to a large extent dictated by political real-
ities,77 resonates in the proposals put forward by the Special Rapporteur, 
the majority of which are conservative. Moreover, some of the more pro-
gressive proposals were watered down to reflect the outcome of discus-
sions within the ILC and the Sixth Committee. As a result, the draft prin-
ciples for the protection of the environment during armed conflict are 
largely reminiscent of existing international law. In spite of that, a closer 
look at the relevant principles reveals that they also contain some inno-
vative aspects, not least because the principles do not distinguish between 
international and non-international armed conflicts, in line with the ILC’s 
approach in its study on the Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties.78 This 
choice is progressive and controversial, as the law applicable to non-in-
ternational armed conflict is less developed than the law applicable to 
international armed conflict and lacks rules specifically protecting the en-
vironment. 
The opening Principle 12 reformulates the famous Martens clause 
included in all major treaties on the law of armed conflict.79 Principle 12 
 
 76. A/CN.4/674, supra note 2, ¶ 62. 
 77. During the debate in the Sixth Committee on the inclusion of the topic in the ILC’s pro-
gramme of work, it was stressed that the Commission “should not attempt to modify existing obli-
gations.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third & Sixty-Fifth Sessions, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/666, at 14 (Jan. 23, 2014). 
 78. Some States, such as China and Korea, expressed criticism for including non-international 
armed conflicts in the study. See China U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 22d mtg. ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.6/70/SR.22 (Nov. 23, 2015) [hereinafter A/C.6/70/SR.22]; Republic of Korea U.N. GAOR, 
70th Sess., 25th mtg. ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.25 (Dec. 2, 2015) [hereinafter A/C.6/70/SR.25]; 
Vietnam, see id. ¶ 41. In its statements with respect to the draft principles as adopted on first read-
ing, China reiterated its concerns, yet it no longer explicitly opposed including non-international 
armed conflicts in the study. See U.N. GAOR, 74th Sess., 27th mtg., ¶ 89 U.N. Doc. 
89A/C.6/74/SR.27 (Nov. 29, 2019). Other States were in favor of such inclusion such as Austria, 
see U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 24th mtg. ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.24 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter 
A/C.6/70/SR.24]; Croatia, see id. ¶ 86; El Salvador, see id. ¶ 96; Italy, see A/C.6/70/SR.22, ¶ 118; 
Lebanon, see A/C.6/70/SR.24, ¶ 60; New Zealand, see A/C.6/70/SR.25, ¶ 101; Portugal, see 
A/C.6/70/SR.24, ¶ 79; Slovenia, see id. ¶ 40; and Switzerland, see A/C.6/70/SR.25, ¶ 98. 
 79. The clause was introduced by the Russian diplomat Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens in the 
preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention and has since been included in various formulations in 
other treaties. Its original formulation is as follows: 
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties 
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles 
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized na-
tions, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience. 
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states that “[i]n cases not covered by international agreements, the envi-
ronment remains under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of 
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”80 The application 
of this clause to the protection of the environment is a clear example of 
progressive development, which truly enhances protection of the envi-
ronment in situations of armed conflict. The choice is, however, less ev-
ident from a systemic perspective. This clause and especially its reference 
to the principles of humanity clearly denote a humanitarian purpose, 
which sits uncomfortably with an approach that seeks to protect the in-
tegrity of the environment itself, as envisaged by the Special Rappor-
teur.81 While the inclusion of the Martens clause was generally welcomed, 
this particular aspect was criticized by some members of the ILC. The 
commentary elegantly resolves the controversy. Where there are gaps in 
the relevant treaties, the “principles of humanity” are understood to pro-
vide residual protection to the environment for the purpose of protecting 
human beings, while the “dictates of public conscience” encompass pro-
tection to the environment for its own sake.82 This approach may be in-
strumental in facilitating the acceptance of the clause by the Sixth Com-
mittee members. 
Principle 13 consists of three paragraphs that contain general rules 
for the protection of the environment during armed conflict. Principle 
13(1) reflects the integrative approach adopted by the principles. It for-
mulates an obligation to respect and protect the environment “in accord-
ance with applicable international law and, in particular, the law of armed 
conflict.”83 Principle 13 builds on the ILC’s study on the Effects of Armed 
Conflict on Treaties, adopting its progressive stance with respect to the 
continued applicability of international environmental law and human 
rights law in situations of armed conflicts.84 
 
See Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land Preamble, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat 
1803, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150. 
 80. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 247. 
 81. A/CN.4/728, supra note 2, ¶ 181. Support for this position can be found inter alia in the 
U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Decade of International Law, at 49-50, U.N. Doc. 
A/49/323, annex (Aug. 19, 1994). 
 82. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 247. 
 83. Id. at 250. 
 84. This position was met with some criticism, notably by the UK. See U.N. GAOR, 60th 
Sess., 20th mtg. ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/60/SR.20 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
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Principle 13(2) formulates a duty of care for belligerents to “protect 
the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe dam-
age.”85 This Principle is both progressive and conservative in some re-
spects. It is progressive as it elevates a treaty rule applicable exclusively 
to international armed conflicts into a general rule that applies irrespec-
tive of the type of armed conflict or the capacity of the belligerents. Its 
inclusion in the draft principles settled a decade long debate over whether 
the prohibition to inflict widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the 
environment, as included in Article 55 of Additional Protocol I, can be 
considered to constitute customary international law, as posited by the 
2005 ICRC customary law study.86 It is also conservative, as it retains the 
threshold set out in Article 55 of Additional Protocol I. This is disappoint-
ing as it was precisely the high cumulative threshold of “widespread, 
long-term and severe” damage contained in that provision that spurred 
much of the scholarly debate regarding the inadequacy of the law of 
armed conflict in protecting the environment, which underlies the UN 
Environment and ELI’s request to the ILC to revisit the international legal 
framework.87 The commentary also does not provide any interpretative 
guidance with respect to the requisites of the threshold. This is surely a 
missed opportunity to reinterpret the threshold’s key terms from an eco-
system perspective, as adopted in international environmental law. For 
this reason, the current authors advocate that the commentary should be 
amended to clarify that the threshold is to be interpreted in accordance 
with the most recent scientific insights into the functions of ecosystems. 
Such an approach would lower the threshold, as it acknowledges that eco-
systems are functional units and therefore, that harm to their components 
has broader implications.88 
Principle 13(3) determines that the environment is to be treated as a 
prima facie civilian object. It determines that “[n]o part of the natural 
 
 85. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 250. 
 86. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 46, at 151-55. 
 87. See, e.g., Phoebe N. Okowa, Natural Resources in Situations of Armed Conflict: Is There 
a Coherent Framework for Protection?, 9 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 250 (2007); see also Press Release, 
Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Final Rep. to the Prosecutor by the Comm. Estab-
lished to Rev. the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia ¶¶ 14-25 
(June 13, 2000), https://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-re-
view-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal. 
 88. See KAREN HULME, WAR TORN ENVIRONMENT: INTERPRETING THE LEGAL THRESHOLD 
14 (2004). See also Dutch Delegation to the Sixth Committee, Official Statement on International 
Law Commission (ILC) Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts ¶ 7 (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/73/pdfs/english/poe_nether-
lands.pdf. 
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environment may be attacked, unless it is a military objective.”89 This is 
significant, as Principle 13(3) implies that a commander may not deliber-
ately target a part of the environment, unless it is clear that this part, by 
its location or use, makes an effective contribution to military action.90 
The reference to “parts” of the environment benefitting from protection 
instead of to the environment as a whole is also significant. The original 
proposal for the Principle declared the natural environment as such “ci-
vilian in nature.”91 This formulation was, however, criticized by some 
ILC members for being overly broad and even contradictory to provisions 
providing protection to the environment under relevant treaties,92 while 
representatives in the Sixth Committee emphasized the need to “clarify in 
the commentaries that there was no basis for treating the natural environ-
ment in its entirety as a civilian object for the purpose of the law of armed 
conflicts . . . .”93 Thus, the current formulation is a compromise, which 
seeks to balance the interests of environmental protection with the reali-
ties of armed conflict. 
Principle 14 elaborates on Principle 13(1), in that it refers to the role 
of the law of armed conflict and its fundamental principles; namely dis-
tinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautions in attack, in 
providing environmental protection. This is a typical example of a prin-
ciple that was watered-down as a result of divergent opinions within the 
ILC. The original proposal by Special Rapporteur Jacobsson determined 
that the law of armed conflict and its principles were to be applied “in a 
manner so as to enhance the strongest possible protection of the environ-
ment.”94 In its revised form, the Principle merely indicates that these prin-
ciples “shall be applied to the natural environment, with a view to its pro-
tection.”95 It thereby sets a lower standard for protection than envisaged 
by the Special Rapporteur, although it still does justice to the proposal, 
which meant to clarify that the cardinal principles of the law of armed 
 
 89. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 46, at 143. 
 90. See Protocol I, supra note 37, at art. 52, which defines military objectives as “those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.” 
 91. See Principle 1 as proposed by the Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/685, supra note 2, at annex 
I. 
 92. See Int’l Law Comm’n, 67th Sess., 3264th mtg. at 9-11, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SR.3264 (May 
6, 2016) (statement by Mr. Sean Murphy). 
 93. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/689, ¶ 62, at 14 (Jan. 28, 2016). 
 94. See Principle 2 as proposed by the Special Rapporteur (emphasis added), A/CN.4/685, 
supra note 2, at annex I. 
 95. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 254 (emphasis added). 
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conflict must be applied for the purpose of environmental protection. Fur-
thermore, it is relevant to note that this Principle should be read together 
with the duty of care included in Principle 13(2), which sets the upper 
limit for permissible environmental damage. 
Given the general nature of Principle 14, Principle 15 is confusing. 
This Principle, which reads “[e]nvironmental considerations shall be 
taken into account when applying the principle of proportionality and the 
rules on military necessity,”96 rephrases a famous statement by the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion with 
respect to the protection of the environment during armed conflict.97 The 
stated purpose of this Principle is to introduce an operational perspec-
tive,98 but its added value, in light of Principle 14, is questionable. 
Principle 16 states that “[a]ttacks against the natural environment by 
way of reprisals are prohibited.”99 This Principle is another example of 
progressive development, as highlighted in the commentary.100 Not only 
does it confirm the customary law status of the prohibition included in 
Article 55(2) of Additional Protocol I, but it also extends it to non-inter-
national armed conflicts. This progressive approach can be contrasted 
with Principle 19 on environmental modification techniques, which 
merely restates relevant obligations under the ENMOD Convention.101 
The phrase “[i]n accordance with their international obligations” in Prin-
ciple 19 makes it abundantly clear that it applies exclusively to States that 
are parties to the ENMOD Convention and to other States only to the 
extent that the prohibition to use the environment as a weapon reflects 
customary international law.102 
Lastly, Principle 18, which states that “[p]illage of natural resources 
is prohibited,” addresses the illegal exploitation of natural resources by 
 
 96. Id. at 256. 
 97. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 
30 (July 8) (“States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is 
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.”). It is not entirely clear 
how this statement should be read. The Court refers to the principles of proportionality and neces-
sity in relation to States’ right to self-defense, which would indicate that it refers to jus ad bellum 
and not to jus in bello. Yet, it is apparent from the context that the Court intends to address propor-
tionality and necessity as principles of jus in bello.  
 98. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 257. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 259-60. This Principle generated considerable debate within the ILC, both with re-
spect to its customary law status and with its extension to non-international armed conflicts. For a 
summary of the debate, see id. at 257-60. 
 101. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD), opened for signature May 18, 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 
[hereinafter ENMOD Convention]; A/74/10, supra note 1, at 264. 
 102. A/74/10, supra note 1, at 264. 
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parties to an armed conflict for the purpose of financing warfare,103 a prac-
tice that can seriously disrupt the environment and has been a prevalent 
problem in several contemporary armed conflicts. The inclusion of this 
Principle is important, as it expressly confirms that the longstanding pro-
hibition of pillage applies to instances of illegal exploitation of natural 
resources in armed conflicts. It is inspired by relevant judgments by the 
Nuremberg military tribunals and the 2005 judgment by the International 
Court of Justice on Armed activities on the territory of the Congo, in 
which the Court held the prohibition of pillage applicable to the looting, 
plundering, and exploitation of natural resources by members of the 
Ugandan armed forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.104 
D.  Principles Applicable in Situations of Occupation 
The three principles applicable to situations of occupation comple-
ment those that apply to all belligerents. The commentary clarifies that 
the inclusion of a separate section on occupation by no means seeks to 
deviate from the temporal approach adopted by the study. Instead, it seeks 
to offer “a practical solution reflecting the great variety of circumstances 
that may qualify as a situation of occupation,” some resembling peace-
time conditions, others marked by active hostilities.105 Arguably, the po-
sition of occupying powers further differs in one important respect from 
that of other belligerents, in the sense that occupying powers assume spe-
cial responsibilities as de facto authorities and administrators of territory. 
As a consequence, relevant obligations of occupying powers under inter-
national human rights law and international environmental law must take 
more prominence, both independently and with respect to the interpreta-
tion of obligations of occupying powers under the law of armed conflict. 
This position is reflected in the relevant principles. Additionally, it was 
suggested to include a principle on international organizations as admin-
istrators of territory.106 This suggestion was not followed, as it would go 
 
 103. Id. at 260-61. It should be noted that “illegal exploitation of natural resources” is used as 
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well beyond the law of occupation proper. Nevertheless, it was under-
stood that the neutral term “occupying power” would leave the door open 
to subsequent developments in international law.107 
Principle 20 sets out the general obligations of occupying powers 
with respect to the environment of the occupied territory, as derived from 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 
1907.108 It consists of three parts. Principle 20(1) focuses on the obligation 
of the occupying power to respect and protect the environment in accord-
ance with applicable international law, which includes relevant obliga-
tions under international human rights and environmental law. Principle 
20(2) elaborates this obligation by requiring an occupying power to “take 
appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to the environment of 
the occupied territory that is likely to prejudice the health and well-being 
of the population of the occupied territory.”109 This obligation builds on 
Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I and international human rights law, 
while the threshold for environmental harm is derived from international 
environmental law.110 The Principle was introduced at the instigation of 
several ILC members who felt that the human rights obligations of occu-
pying powers, including with respect to the right to health, life, and food, 
should receive more emphasis.111 Finally, Principle 20(3) requires the oc-
cupying power to respect the law and institutions of the occupied territory 
concerning the protection of the environment. This obligation resembles 
the text of Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, but it includes a 
more permissible stance with regards to the introduction of changes in 
the occupied territory’s law and institutions, reflecting evolving standards 
in the law of occupation.112 
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An evolutionary interpretation of the law of occupation, reading in-
ternational human rights and environmental law into it, also underlies 
Principle 21 on the sustainable use of natural resources. This Principle is 
based on Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which contains the 
principle of usufruct.113 Principle 21 consolidates modern interpretations 
of the principle of usufruct, accounting for the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) and the right to self-determi-
nation, reflected in the obligation of the occupying power to administer 
and use natural resources for the benefit of the population of the occupied 
territory.114 The Principle also consolidates obligations derived from the 
concept of sustainable development, namely the obligation to ensure their 
sustainable use. In this way, the Principle significantly contributes to clar-
ifying the implications of modern developments with respect to the right 
to self-determination, the principle of PSNR and sustainable development 
for an occupying power’s rights and obligations with respect to the use 
of natural resources in occupied territories. 
Finally, Principle 22 formulates an obligation for the occupying 
power to exercise due diligence to ensure that activities in the occupied 
territory do not cause significant harm to the environment in areas beyond 
the occupied territory.115 This Principle builds on the duty of vigilance, 
identified by the International Court of Justice in its judgement concern-
ing Armed Activities in the Territory of the DR Congo, and the principle 
of prevention derived from international environmental law.116 
The three principles on occupation are prime examples of how an 
integrative approach can both consolidate and develop existing obliga-
tions under the relevant fields of international law. Interestingly, State 
delegations in the Sixth Committee interpreted the principles primarily as 
examples of progressive development.117 Nevertheless, it should be em-
phasized that the principles to a large extent reflect developments in State 
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practice as well as international case law over the past century.118 In this 
sense, it would be more appropriate to qualify them as codification based 
on evolutionary interpretation. 
E.  Principles Applicable after Armed Conflict 
Part Five contains six principles applicable after armed conflict. The 
principles address environmental damage related to armed conflict and 
the procedure for restoration and reparation of such damage. Further-
more, they are largely based on the duty to cooperate with respect to re-
mediating environmental damage in relation to armed conflict. The prin-
ciples seek to enable engagement of and collaboration with States and 
international organizations that are in a position to assist in order to pre-
vent, remediate, or restore environmental damage.119 
One of the difficulties in the post-conflict phase is to determine 
which obligations apply, as these situations are transitory: the armed con-
flict has ended, but peace has not yet been restored. Consequently, peace-
time rules, in as far as their application is not hampered by the situation 
on the ground, co-apply with the law of armed conflict, which remains 
relevant to a limited extent.120 This difficulty may explain why the major-
ity of the principles in Part Five are formulated as recommendations. The 
co-application of the law of armed conflict, including weapons conven-
tions, further explains why several of the principles refer to “parties to an 
armed conflict,” which, significantly, also refers to non-State armed 
groups.121 
Principle 23 calls on parties to an armed conflict to address environ-
mental protection and restoration during a peace process. It also appeals 
to international organizations to facilitate such steps. The inclusion of the 
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Principle is motivated by how environmental considerations are increas-
ingly included in peace processes.122 While the Principle itself does not 
add much from a normative perspective, it is noteworthy from a policy 
perspective. Recent findings in social sciences scholarship show clear 
links between environmental degradation and mismanagement of natural 
resources and conflict relapse.123 
Principle 23 highlights the need to remedy and restore environmen-
tal damage, as well as manage environmentally related factors, inducing 
renewed conflicts as part of peace processes. However, as highlighted by 
Hulme, the Principle could have been accompanied with further environ-
mental guidelines “to inform future peace processes.”124 
Principle 24 deals with States’ responsibility to share and grant ac-
cess to relevant information to facilitate remedial measures after an armed 
conflict. While the duty to share information is owed towards other 
States, the duty to grant access to information refers to States’ obligations 
towards individuals.125 The obligations under this Principle may also be 
extended to third States that are not belligerents but have relevant infor-
mation for remedial actions.126 Furthermore, the Principle includes a ref-
erence to States’ existing obligations under international law, which is 
intended to reflect “that treaties contain obligations relevant in the con-
text of the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, 
which may be instrumental for the purpose of the taking of remedial 
measures after an armed conflict.”127 This suggests that the Principle itself 
only serves as a reminder to States to comply with their existing obliga-
tions related to the sharing of and granting of access to information. For 
instance, the commentary to the Principle refers to the duty to keep a rec-
ord of placement of landmines, booby traps, and other devices as well as 
for the use of explosive ordnance or abandonment of explosive ordnance, 
and that after the cessation of the active hostilities, States shall make such 
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information available to other parties to the conflict.128 Furthermore, sev-
eral environmental treaties contain reporting obligations, which may also 
be directly relevant to restore the environment after armed conflict. With 
respect to the granting of information, the Principle draws from several 
legal fields, including the participatory rights enshrined in international 
environmental and human rights law.129 The duty to grant access to infor-
mation obligates States to gather environmental information and to make 
it available to the public.130 However, the Principle does not provide de-
tails on the type of information or the modalities for access, except that it 
should be “relevant.”131 The result leaves many uncertainties regarding 
the rights of local communities with respect to participation in environ-
mental remediation. Finally, the Principle excludes information that is 
vital to States’ national defence or security. 
Principle 25 encourages cooperation among relevant actors with re-
spect to post-armed conflict environmental assessments and remedial 
measures. Post-conflict environmental assessments (PCEAs) differ from 
regular environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Whereas EIAs are em-
ployed as preventative measures, PCEAs are emerging as tools “to main-
stream environmental considerations in the development plans in the 
post-conflict phase.”132 These assessments contribute to discovering en-
vironmental risks that may affect “health, livelihoods and security and to 
provide recommendations to national authorities on how to address 
them.”133 UN Environment has completed several PCEAs, contributing to 
a broader understanding of the types of damages caused by armed con-
flicts and identifying appropriate measures to address them. The com-
mentary to the Principle highlights the importance of ensuring that post-
conflict situations are not left unattended, as these can contribute to de-
stabilizing the society and trigger a relapse to armed conflict.134 Yet, legal 
obligations as well as practice addressing post-conflict environmental 
damage are scarce, which explains the recommendatory character of Prin-
ciple 25. 
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Principle 26 addresses environmental restoration and compensation 
in situations in which “the source of environmental damage is unidenti-
fied or reparation is not available.”135 The Principle aims at encouraging 
States to take measures to remedy the harm, including by means of a vol-
untary compensation fund. These ex gratia responses are based on prac-
tice related to the compensation of injury and damage, also resulting from 
lawful actions. This could be the case when a State does not admit re-
sponsibility and perhaps wishes to exclude the possibility of any addi-
tional liability by conditioning the compensation.136 
Principles 27 and 28 address the problem of toxic and hazardous 
remnants of war, which are a major source of environmental pollution. 
Principle 27 formulates an obligation for parties to an armed conflict to 
“seek to remove or render harmless toxic and hazardous remnants of war 
under their jurisdiction or control that are causing or risk causing damage 
to the environment.”137 Even though formulated as an obligation of con-
duct, the Principle represents an important step to protect the environment 
from wartime damage. This general obligation complements existing ob-
ligations for parties to an armed conflict with respect to specific remnants 
of war, such as mines and explosive ordinances, covered by Protocol II 
and V to the Conventional Weapons Convention, the 2008 Cluster Muni-
tions Convention and the Ottawa Convention.138 This follows from the 
“without prejudice” disclaimer included in Principle 27(3).139 Principle 
28 is more limited in scope. It addresses the specific problem of remnants 
of war at sea, including beyond national jurisdiction, and encourages 
States and international organizations to cooperate to ensure that these 
remnants do not constitute a danger to the environment. Of course, the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea may provide a relevant legal 
framework, especially its Part XII on protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, which contains provisions on global and regional 
cooperation.140 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This article sets out to critically assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of the draft principles and highlight their principal innovations, in light 
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of their objective to enhance the protection of the environment in relation 
to armed conflict. The ILC’s work to take on the study is certainly im-
pressive. It has managed to bring in many different aspects relating to the 
environment and armed conflicts under one framework. More im-
portantly, the temporal approach has facilitated consideration of legal is-
sues beyond traditional armed conflict situations, including those that 
have hitherto received little systemic attention. Prime examples include 
obligations for parties to an armed conflict with respect to toxic remnants 
of war and the obligations of States with respect to peace operations and 
corporate responsibility. Further, by employing a dynamic and integra-
tive approach to the interpretation of relevant obligations under the law 
of armed conflict, international environmental and human rights law, the 
study has also significantly contributed to clarifying the legal positions 
of occupying powers with respect to environmental protection. 
Yet, the study also presents some weaknesses. These relate most no-
tably to the protection of the environment during armed conflict. Of 
course, there was limited space for the Commission to develop the appli-
cable law. However, in some respects, it could have been more ambitious. 
One example concerns the interpretation of the upper threshold for per-
missible environmental harm. The ILC’s decision to refrain from provid-
ing guidance on the interpretation of the key terms of this threshold is 
truly regrettable. It is equally regrettable that the Commission failed to 
provide guidance regarding the effects of armed conflict on the obliga-
tions of States under relevant environmental agreements. It is understand-
able that the ILC could not assess the applicability of all existing multi-
lateral environmental agreements, but it would have been useful if it had 
analyzed the principal environmental treaties, most notably those listed 
in the commentaries to Principle 4. These are the World Heritage Con-
vention, the Biological Diversity Convention and the Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands.141 
Overall, it can therefore be argued that the study has made important 
substantive contributions to enhancing protection to the environment, but 
it also missed opportunities to advance the law in this field. Furthermore, 
the choice for principles instead of articles implies that the ILC’s ambi-
tions were modest. The higher level of abstraction that is inherent in prin-
ciples indicates that they should primarily serve to guide States’ actions. 
This is somewhat at odds with the mandatory character of some of the 
obligations that have been formulated in the principles. At the same time, 
the flexible nature of the principles is well suited for addressing topics in 
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the environmental realm, as environmental obligations are often open-
ended and context-based. In this sense, the draft principles may serve as 
an example for future studies on environmental topics and perhaps will 
also encourage the Commission to undertake more politically sensitive 
studies, such as the new study on sea-level rise. In this time of treaty stag-
nation, there is all the more need for an active Commission reminding 
States of their existing and emerging obligations under international law. 
 
